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act of 1855, incorporated into Code
of 1873, it is provided that a rail-
way company shall be liable to an
employ6 as to a passenger for want
of care in running their train. The
fact of his being an employ6 shall
not bar his recovery if he is himself
without default.
NoTz.-For an exhaustive dis-
cussion of the whole subject see
McKinney on " Fellow Servants,"
and for the cases in Pennsylvania,
a pamphlet by Mr. A. Bolles, issued
by Department of the Interior of
Pennsylvania, in 189i, on "The
Liability of Employers in Penn-
sylvania."
FRANCIS H. BOHLEN.
DEPARTMENT OF PROPERTY.
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF,
HON. CLEMENT B. PENROSE,
ALFRED ROLAND HAIG.
Assisted by
WILLIAMi A. DAVIS. JOSEPH T. TAYLOR.
EHRET v. SCHUYLKiLL RIVER EAST SIDE R. R. Co.,
APPELLANT,' SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.
Eminent Domain:-Leaseholds-Damages.
Where, in a proceeding to recover damages for leasehold premises ap-
propriated by a railroad company under the right of eminent domain, it
appears that plaintiffi were under a contract to remove daily from the gas.
works of the City of Philadelphia, adjoining their leased premises on the.
River Schuylkill, a large quantity of tar, and that the premises in ques-
tion, which they leased from the city, enabled them to receive the tar
without cost and to manufacture it without transporting it to and from
distant points, it is proper to admit evidence that, after the land was taken,
it became necessary to carry the tar to a place of distillation by a boat
specially constructed; that it was necessary to erect temporary works for
the distillation of the tar when received; and that it was necessary to.
haul over inaccessible roads the barrels needed to hold the tar and its,
.products.
THE MnASURE OF DAMAGES FOR THE APPROPRIATION OF LEAsEHoLDs,
,By THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF EMINENT DOMAIN.
There aie two requisites to a must be for a public purpose and
valid exercise of the right of emi- compensation must be made. Con-
nent domain: the property taken stitutios of the various States con-
1 Reported in 30 W. N. C., 564; 151 Pa., 158. Decided October 3,
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.ain provisions guaranteeing just
compensation for property appro-
priated by an exercise of the sover-
eign's delegated right of eminent
domain. But before the enactment
of constitutions the right to com-
pensation was admitted as an indis-
pensable incident to the right, and
in reality is independent of consti-
tutional authority: 3o Am. Law
Reg., 449, 452, 465.
Where an entire tract of land
is appropriated, the compensation
to the owner is its market value in
money: 30.Am. Law Reg., 491; 6
Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, 567;
Lewis on Eminent Domain, H 463,
478. Where only a portion of a
tract of land is taken, the value of
what is appropriated is recoverable
and damages to the portion unap-
propriated : .Lewis on Eminent Do-
main, g. 464. But it often happens
that the partial appropriation bene-
fits the unappropriated part of a
tract of land. In that event the
measure of compensation differs in
various States: Id., 465. In Mis-
sissippi benefits are not considered:
Id., 466. In Maryland, Nebraska,
Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia
and Wisconsin special benefits only
are allowed to be set off against
damages to the remainder, but not
against the value of the land which
is taken: Id., 467. In Georgia,
Kentucky, Louisiana and Texas,
general and special benefits can be
set off against damages to the part
of land not taken, but not against the
value of what is taken: Id., 468.
In Alabama, California, Delaware,
Illinois, Indiana, New York, Ohio,
Oregon and South Carolina general
and special benefits may be set off
against both damages to the re-
mainder and the value of the part
of the land taken: Id., 470. In
Connecticut, Kansas, Maine, Min-
nesota, Massachusetts, Missouri,
New Hampshire, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania and
Vermont only special benefits may
be set off against both the value of
the part taken and damages to the
portion of the land unappropriated:
Id., 469. The rule in Pennsyl-
vania was formulated by GIsSON,
J., as follows: "What would the
property, unaffected by the obstruc-
tion, have sold for, at the time
the injury was committed? What
would it have sold for, as affected
by the injury? The difference is
the true measure of compensation: "
Schuylkill Navigation Co. v. Tho-
burn, 7 .S. & R., 411, 422-3 (1821).
In the adjustment of thisdifference,
a fair and just comparison must be
made of the advantages and dis-
advantages necessarily resulting.
Special advantages and actual dis-
advantages to the particular prop-
erty alone are to be considered. If'
the particular property advances in
market value beyond the general
increase in value of other neighbor-
ing properties, this element of ad--
vantage can be considered. The
disadvantages must, in no sense,
be speculative, but it is essential
that they affect the present market
value of the land: 30 Am. Law
Reg., 492-3. The market value in-
cludes the value for particular uses
to which the land is peculiarly
adapted: Lewis on Eminent Do--
main, . 479; 3o Am. Law Reg.,
498. But speculative inquiries as
to possible uses and improvements
of the property are not permissible
in estimating damages: Lewis on
Eminent Domain: Id., ? 480. In
estimating damages for the ap--
propriation of a portion of a farm,
the jury may consider, as an ele-
ment of damage in estimating the
injury to the entire tract, that a part
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was ripe for building improvement;
but calculations based upon values
.at which the building lots would
sell are erroneous: Wilson v. Equit-
able Gas Co., 31 W. N. C., 451
(1893). The compensationmust be
,estimated for the land as such: Lewis
on Eminent Domain, 486. The
value of land as farming land or
mining land is recoverable; but the
value of coal or stone, supposed to
underlie the tract, is not to be con-
Ssidered: Id., 30 Am. Law Reg.,
497. The elements to be considered
are "as varied as the properties af-
fected and the uses to which they
-are applied:" Kersey v. R. R. Co.,
133 Pa., 234, 240; 25 W. N. C., 455
.(I89o). In Pittsburg, Brad. & Buf.
Rwy. Co. v. McCloskey, iio Pa.,
436, 442," 443 (I885), CLARK, J.,
said: "The inconvenience arising
from a division of property or from
increased difficulty of access, the
burden of increased fencing, the
ordinary danger from accidental
fires to the fetces, fields or farm
buildings, not resulting from negli-
gence, and generally all such mat-
ters as, owing to the particular
location of the road, may affect the
-convenient use and future enjoy-
ment of the property, are proper
matters for consideration; but they
are to be considered in comparison
with the advantages only as .they
affect the market value of the
land." The risk of fire and the
cost of fencing are elements to be
considered in estimating damages:
Lewis on Eminent Domain, H 497,
498; 30 Am. Law Reg., 496. Evi-
.dence of the loss of custom of a
mill, in consequence of a location
of a railroad in front of it, is ad-
missible, not as a distinct or legiti-
mate item of damage, but to show
to what extent the value of the mill
property has been lessened: 30 Am.
Law Reg., 496. But any supposed
loss of profits cannot be considered,
though the fact that the premises
are more difficult to rent is an ele-
ment which may be considered in
determining the difference in value:
Id.; Lewis on Eminent Domain,
487. In Pittsburg and Western
R.. R. Co. v. Patterson, 107 Pa.,
461, 464-5 (1885), CLARK, J., said:
"The use to which the property
has been, or may be, applied, is
proper for the consideration of the
jury, in the estimate of its value;
its adaptation -for any particular
purpose may enhance its market
value; but the Court was certainly
correct in saying that the jury
could not take into consideration
any supposed loss to the plaintiff of
profits in his business. Such an
assessment would be purely specu-
lative, and a rule which justified it
would lead to most ruinous results.
If the property, by reason of its
location or otherwise, is especially
adapted to any particular use to
which it is applied, if it is worth
more for that particular use than
for any other, its market value will
be measured accordingly." Mr.
LPWIs says, in his treatise on Emi-
nent Domain, 487 (1888): "The
profits of a business do not tend to
prove the value of the property
upon which it is conducted. The
profits of a business depend upon
its extent and character, and the
manner in which it is conducted.
One man will get rich while an-
other will become bankrupt in con-
ducting the same business upon the
same property. It is proper, how-
ever, to show how the taking will
interfere with the use of the prop-
erty, eitherforthe purpose to which
it is actually devoted, or for any
purpose to which it is adapted."
The foregoing general principles
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are peculiarly applicable to the ap-
propriation of property in posses-
sion of the owner; but the owner
may have leased his estate to a
tenant whose possession is dis-
turbed by an appropriation of the
property by the exercise of the
right of eminent domain. Such a
case was that of Ehret v. Schuylkill
River East Side R. R. Co., 151 Pa.,
158 (1892), of which this article is
an annotation.
A tenant for years being the
owner of an estate in the land, it is
well established that he may recover
damages to his interest: 3o Am.
Law Reg., 500, 5oi; 6 Am. and
Eng. Ency. of Law, 59o; Lewis on
Eminent Domain, 483; .Ehret v.
Schuylkill River East Side R. R.
Co., 151 Pa., 158 (1892); Kersey v.
Schuylkill River East Side R. R.
Co., 133 Id., 234 (189o); Penna. S..
V. R. R. Co. vz. Ziemer, 124 Id.,
560, 571 (1889); Lafferty v. Schuyl-
kill River East Side R. R. Co., Id.,
297 (1889); Phila & Read. R. R.
Co. v. Getz. 113 Id., 214 (1886);
Pittsburg & Lake Erie R. R. Co.
v. Jones, xxi Id., 204(1886); Penna.
R. R. Co. v. Eby, io7 Id., x66
(I884); Getz v. Phila. & Read.
R. R. Co., Io5 Pa., 547 (1884). In
Brown v. Powell, 25 Pa., 229, 231
(1855), LBwIs, C. J., said: "A
tenant for years is an owner within
the meaning of the Act, and is en-
titled to compensation, according
to his interest." See, also, Turn-
pike Road v. Brosi, 22 Pa., 29
(1853); Frost v,. Earnest, 4 Wharton
tPa.), 86 (1838); Fitzpatrick v.
Penna. R. R. Co., io Phila. (Pa.),
107 (1874); In re Barbadoes St., 8,
Id., 498 (1871); Bait. & Ohio'R. R.
Co. v. Thompson, IO Md., 76
(1856); Burbridge v. R. R. Co., 9
Ind., 546 (1857); Muller v. Earle,
35 N. Y. Supr. Ct. (3 Jones &
24
Spencer), 461 (1873); Livi igston v.
Sulzer, 19 Hun. (N. Y-),375 (1879);
Coutant v. Catlin, 2 Sandford Chan.
(N. Y.), 485 (1845); Turner v.
Williams, io Wendell (N. Y.), 139
(1833); In re Mayor of New York,
34 Hun, 441; 99 N. Y., 569 (1885);
Alex. & Fred. Rwy Co. v. Faunce,
31 Grattan (Va.), 761 (1879);
Brooks v. City of Boston, i9 Pick:,
174 (1837); Patterson v. City of
Boston, 20 Id., 159 (1838); Chicago
& Evanston R. R. Co. v. Dresel,
no Ills., 89 (1884); Booker v. Rwy
Co., 1o Id., 333 (1882).
In No. Penna. R. R. Co. v.
Davis & Leeds, 26 Pa., 238 (1856),
the railroad company purchased
the reversion of land held by
Davis & Leeds as lessees under a
lease for two years with a covenant
for renewal by lessors upon the ex-
piration of the two years if re-
quested, and were using the land as
a lumber yard, with almost a year
of the first term yet to expire, when
the company appropriated it for.
railroad purposes. WOODWARD, J.,
held (p. 241): "The direct injury
done to them, or, in other words,
the value of the thing taken from
them, was to be measured by the
worth of the lot at the stipulated
rents for the residue of the term of
two years and for the whole of the
term of three years. No assessment
of damages or compensation would
have been just and adequate that
did not embrace both these terms,
for the true measure of the interest
the lessees had in the land was the
joint or aggregate value of the two
terms." The company took all
the lessees had in the land, andwere
required to pay for the value of
their entire estate.
In Renwick v. R. R. Co., 49
Iowa, 664, 674 (1878), it was held
that the measure of damages to
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lessees for the location of a railroad
through the leased premises is the
difference between the value of the
annual use of the premises before
taking the right of way and what it
was worth afterward.
In Patterson v. City of Boston, 20
Pick., I59 (1838), it was held that
for the deprivation of the use of a
store the lessee can recover from
the municipality damages com-
puted for such time as would be
reasonably necessary to remove his
goods and make the repairs and
move back again; the loss or value
of the store to him for that period,
and not the rent and taxes sped-
fically, is the measure of his in-
demnity. He is also to be remun-
erated for the diminished value of
the premises caused by the taking
of a portion, for the residue of the
term, he continuing to pay at the
same rate the rent and taxes. But he
cannot recover for loss of custom
because of occupying a less ad-
vantageous place of business while
repairs were being made.
In Getz v. Phila. & Read. R. R.
Co., 1o5 Pa., 547 (1884), it was de-
cided that landlord and tenant may
unite in a proceeding to recover
damages for the taking and injury
of the property by a railroad com-
pany.- The tenant need not show
that he holds under a written lease
for a term certain; it is sufficient if
it appear that he is a tenant from
year to year at a certain annual
rent. The proper procedure would
be for the jury to designate the
portion of the award to which each
party was entitled. In estimating
the damages to the tenant, the jury
should consider, as elements of
damage, the fact that the location
of the railroad compelled the re-
moval of the business conducted
by the tenant, and the depreciation
in value of the leasehold and of
the machinery and personal prop-
erty of the tenant which he used in
his business, consequent upon the
removal. The difference between
the value of the machinery in con-
nection with the business con-
ducted on the property and its
value to be removed and applied
to the same or other use, is a
proper element of damage for the
consideration of the jury. In that
case, Hiram S. Getz owned the
premises, and Hiram S. Getz and*
James K. Getz, -trading as H. S.
Getz & Co., were the lessees. The
case came again before the Supreme
Court in x886 (Phila. & Read. R. R.
Co. v. Getz, 113 Pa. 214), and, it
was there explicitly held that' if the
location of a railroad so affects the
property as to compel the removal
of the business conducted by ten-
ants from year to year to another
place, and the machinery used in
the business is in consequence de-
preciated as it stands, the differ-
ence between the value of the
machinery in connection with the
business conducted on the property
and its value to be removed and
applied to the same or other uses,
is an element of damage proper for
the jury's consideration. In ascer-
taining the value of the machinery
as it stood after the injury, evi-
dence as to the expense of remov-
ing it, rendered necessary by the
location of the railroad, from the
property to a newplace of business,
is admissible.,
In Kersey v. Schuylkill River
East Side R. R. Co., 133 Pa., 234
(i89o), the plaintiff-was the lessee
of a wharf property under a lease
having eighteen months to run,
when the defendant's railroad ap-
propriated part of the premises.
The terms of the lease restricted
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him to the use of the property as a
-coal yard. The construction of the
railroad destroyed appliances be-
longing to him, which were essen-
tial to the conduct of his business,
and necessitated the construction
-of others in their place by him,
and an increase in the handling of
coal and breakage and waste of it.
It was held that evidence was ad-
missible to show the amount of the
lessee's necessary expenditure in
reconstructing appliances to secure
the facilities for continuing the
business he had previously enjoyed,
.and the increased expense and loss
in handling the coal with them,
not as specific iteihs of claim, but
as affecting the market value of the
leasehold.
This case wqs followed in Ehret
v. Schuylkill River ]East Side R. R.
Co., 151 Pa., 158 (1892). There*
Ehret & Co. showed that by reason
,of the location of their leasehold
property, which the railroad com-
pany appropriated, they were saved
.a certain expense in the perform-
ance of a contract, which was made
because of the advantages of the
location, as fixing their damages;
and also showed the cost to fulfil
the contract in another and distant
place, which they were obliged to
obtain because of the loss of the
leasehold. It was urged that such
testimony was a "covert attempt
to recover profits." But the Court
"'held it was nothing of the
kind." These matters "wete ele-
mentswhich evidently and properly
entered into the consideration and
'determination of the value of the
lease. It was a part of the property
taken by the defendant company as
locumr terensofthe Commonwealth,
property for which defendant was
bound to make just compensation
to plaintiffs, from whom it was
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taken .... On principle, as well as
authority, we think such evidence
was not improper. In Railway Co.
v. Vance, 115 Pa., 327, testimony
was received to prove loss of cus-
tom at a mill, not with the view of
recovering the amount as damages,
but for the purpose of showing the
extent to which the value of the
mill property has been diminished.
Railroad Co. v. Getz, 113 Pa., 2r4,
recognizes the right of owners of a
leasehold to recover, as damages,
the cost of removing their machin-
ery:" per SiRu.PEtT, J., 15r Pa.,
66, 167.
In Penna. R. R. Co. v. Eby, 107
Pa., 166 (1884), it was held proper
for the plaintiff to prove, as the
measure of damages, the value of
the leasehold over the rent he paid
for it. He was afterward permitted
to testify that had he "stayed on
there, rather than moved away, it
would have paid me $iooo a year; "
which was held to be testimony in
the nature of future profits, and in-
admissible. TRuN-Kny, J., said
(p. 173): "It was competent to
prove the market value of the lease-
hold by the opinion of witnesses in
the same manner as it would be
the value of other property. That
value is what the leasehold was
worth-it was worth to the plain-
tiff the same sum as it was worth
for sale and transfer, and the mode
of ascertaining the sum is by testi-
mony of witnesses upon its market
value. If by reason of the taking
of the property, or its destruction,
the plaintiff was specially injured,
he is entitled to compensation for
such injury, as for the time neces-
sarily required in removing and
the expenses of such removal, and
for other loss directly resulting from
defendant's act. That does not in-
clude estimated profits of future
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trade or business, or other supposed
consequential injury."
In Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R. R.
Co. v. Jones, iiI Pa., 2o4 (1886), the
plaintiff owned a ferry and held a
leasehold in the landing, and the
defendant constructed a railroad
materially interfering with the land-
ing of boats. It was held that the
measure of defendant's liability was
the difference between the value of
the leasehold for the purpose to
which it was applied until the end
of the term under ordinary circum-
stances, and its value for the same
period as affected by the construc-
tion of the railroad, and that it was
error to allow the recovery of dam-
ages for the depreciation of the
value of the franchise unconnected
with the leasehold.
In Lafferty v. Schuylkill River
East Side R. R. Co., 124 Pa., 297
(1889), a tenant to whom land was
demised with notice that a railroad
was located upon it, was allowed
the value of growing crops, de-
stroyed by the construction, whicli
were planted before he had notice
of the time when the company
would interferewith his possession.
The right to be paid for an injury
to growing crops passed with the
right to plant them. Having notice
of the tenant's possession, the com-
pany could not discharge their lia-
bility to him by a payment to his
landlord. The general rule is that
the value of interests in land is to
be determined at the time of the
location of the railroad or com-
mencement of proceedings for con-
demnation : Burt v. Merchants' Ins.
Co., 115 Mass., 1 (1874); Lawrence's
Appeal, 78 Pa., 365 (1875). There-
fore no recovery can be had for im-
provements made by the lessee after
the filing of a petition to condemn:
Schreiber v. R. R. Co., 115 Ills.,
34o (1885); Chicago, E. & L. S. R.
R. Co. v. Catholic Bishop of Chica-
go, i19 Id., 525 (1887.
An interesting subject is the con-
sideration of the method of assess-
ing damages as between lessbr and
lessee, respectively, when their in--
terests are entirely taken.
Some of the cases are to the effect
that a taking by eminent domain
extinguishes the lease, while others.
hold that the covenants are not
necessarily affected: Lewis on Emi-
nent Domain, -483; 2 Taylor's.
Landlord and Tenant, 5i9, and
cases cited in notes; Barclay v.
Pickles, 38 Mo., 143 (I866). In
Footev. City of Cincinnati, ii Ohio,
4o8 (1842), it was held that the cove-
nant to pay rent subsists, though
the whole property has been appro-
priated; and, therefore, the com-
pensation to the lessee by the taker
must at least cover such rent. In
City of Chicago v. Garrity, 7 Ills.
App. (Bradwell), 474 (I88o), it was.
held that as a tenant is entitled to
compensation for so much of his.
leasehold estate as is taken for pub-
lic use, there is no reason why he
should be excused from a perform--
ance of the covenants of the lease;
the condemnation of land does not
in any way extinguish the lease.
In Parks v.City of Boston, 15 Pick.
(Mass.), 198 (1834); it was held by
SHAW, C. J., that lessor and lessee
are entitled to recover compensa-
tion for the damages sustained by
them respectively in consequence
of an appropriation of part of the
premises. The lessee must pay the
rent because he still holds whatwas.
granted him in consideration of the
rent subject to the sovereign right
of 'eminent domain. He has ample
remedy against the public, the fact.
that he is compelled to pay full
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-compensation for al estate dimin-
ished fn value being an element of
compensation to be received from
the public. See, also, Patterson v.
City of Boston, 20 Pick, 159 (1838);
O'Brien v. Ball, 119 Mass., 28 (a875);
Folts v. Huntley, 7%Vendell (N. Y.),
210 (1831); Workman v. Mifflin, 30
Pa., 362 (1858); Dyerv. Wightman,
66 Id., 425 (1871).
If a property taken by right of
eminent domain has been leased,
the estate of the landlord is in the
reversion. His voluntary act has
given a part of his estate to his ten-
ant. There is a division of the
.ownership. The landlord is not
entitled to the full value of the
estate, because he has a less interest.
Both lessor and lessee are, there-
fore, to be compensated in propor-
tion to the damages sustained re-
spectively, because of an appropria-
tion of the property or injury to it
by a taking for public use. The
sum of the damages to those holding
various interests in the property,
therefore, cannot exceed the value
ofthe fee, because the value ofthefee
comprises the values of the various
-estates into which a property is ap-
portioned. If the value of the fee
is paid the owner, the lessee can re-
,cover from him the value of his
estate, which is included in the fee.
If the entire property be taken,
the measure of damages, as has
been seen, is the market value.
The market value to the lessor is
diminished by the value of the
leasehold. If the leasehold have
no value exceeding the rent, then
the tenant's interest is worth only
the rent for which he is liable. If
under no liability, and possess-
ing a valueless leasehold, the ten-
ant suffers nothing, and the land-
lord gets the full market value of
the property lie had leased. But
the annual value of a leasehold
often exceeds the annual rent. This
excess of rental value over the rent
reserved is the value of the tenant's
interest, for which he must be com-
pensated.
In re William and Anthony
Streets, x9 Wendell (N. Y.), 678
(1839), it was held that commission-
ers for laying out streets in New
York, in estimating damages for
property taken, must consider all
covenants and conditions in a lease
where the land is held for a term of
years thereunder. If there is a cov-
enant for renewal, which at the rent
reserved may add to the value of
the tenant's interest, such value, in
addition to the present value of the
term, should be allowed the tenant.
If the rent reserved equals the full
annual value of the property, the
landlord gets all the damages, since
the tenant in that event loses noth-
ing, or, at most, a nominal sum. If
the rent is less than the annual
value, then the tenant sustains a
loss by the appropriation. In that
event the longer the term was to
continue the greater is the tenant's
loss, while the loss to the landlord
as owner of the fee is correspond-
ingly diminished. So, also, the
covenants in a lease may increase
the value of the reversion and be
detrimental to the tenant, and are
to be considered in estimating the
value of the reversion to the land-
lord.
It re Morgan R. R. & S. S. Co.,
32 La. An., 371 (188o), it appeared
that the company appropriated a
certain lot of ground in New Or-
leans for its uses. The lot was
under lease for a term of three
years, with privilege of renewal for
three additional years, at a monthly
rental of$6o. The owner's measure
of damages was held to be the value
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of his property encumbered by a
lease. If the lessee's estate was
only worth what he agreed to pay
for it, then as the company became
the owner subject to the lease, to it
was due the rent in fituro, and
nothing was due by it to the lessee.
But if the lessee's right was worth
more than be agreed to pay for it,
then the company owed him the
amount of this excess, because he
is entitled to the value of the right
taken from him. The compensa-
tion to the owner does not include
the lessee's damages because of the
value of the lease beyond the rent
agreed to be paid when the com-
pany practically assumes all the
right and estate of the lessor.
SPFN--cR, J., said: "The only true
'test of this excess of the value of
the lease over the stipulated -rental
or price thereof is to ascertain what
sum the right of lease or leasehold
will bring over and above the rent
stipulated to be paid. In the case
before us the rental is $6o per
month. if the right of lease would
sell for $75 per month of its term,
then the excess of its value over
the price is $15 per month."
In Burt v. Merchants' Ins. Co.,
115 Mass., 1 (1874), which was a
proceeding to assess damagesto the
insurance company as owner of
land appropriated for the enlarge-
ment of the Boston post office, the
trial judge instructed the jury as
follows: "It is the fair market value
thatyou are to ascertain; and your
verdict will consist of several items,
substantially these: In the first place
you will ascertain the total amount
of the value to the owners of the
estate, estimating the same as an
entire estate, and as if the same
was the sole property of one owner
in fee simple; and that may not im-
properly be called the total value
of the estate. In the next place
yqu will ascertain the fair value of
the estate to the Merchants' Insur-
ance Company who, in this case,
are the owners of the fee of the
land, In the third item you will
ascertain and find the fair market
value of the interest and term of
Haley, the first lessee. In the fourth
item you will ascertain the fair mar-
ket value of the interest and term
of Harris & Avery, the sub-lessees.
And the sum of the last three items
will be equal to the first; for it is a
diversion that you are to make
among these several parties in in-
terest." In affirming these instruc-
tions GRAY, C. J., said: "No con-
tracts between the ownArs of differ-
ent interests in the land can affect
the right of the government to take
the land for the public use, or oblige
it to pay by way of compensation
more than the entire value of the
land as a whole. . . . The peti-
tioner shows no just ground of ex-
ception to the instructions in this
respect. The jury were clearly di-
rected to ascertain in the first place
the total amount of the value to the
owners of the estate, estimating it
as an entire estate as if it was the
sole property of one owner in fee
simple, regard being had to the sit-
uation of the estate and the manner
of its occupation; and then divide
that total value aniong the owners
of the fee and the lessees and sub-
lessees:" 115 Mass., 5, 15-16.
The same conclusion was reached
by the same Court in a previous
case, where itwas said by WELLs, J.:
"The situation of the estate and
the manner of its occupation are
doubtless to be taken into consid-
eration in estimating the injury
calased by disturbing that occupa-
tion. But between the public and
the land owner it is but one estate.
APPROPRIATION OF LEASEHOLDS.
The public right is exercised upon
the land itself, without regard to
subdivisions of interest by which
the subject is affected through the
various contracts of individual own-
ers. The public cannot be expected
to forego its right to take property
for public uses because the exercise
of that right will defeat private con-
tracts; nor is it reasonable that
losses arising from the failure of
such contracts, which otherwise
might furnish grounds of damage
between the individual parties,
should measure the compensation
to be rendered for the property so
taken. Such a rule would seriously
impair the public right. A fair
compensation for the property
taken and injury done, ascertained
by general rules, is a substitute to
the owners for that of which they
are deprived. That is the whole of
the transaction witl which the pub-
lic is concerned. The apportion-
ment is merely a setting out to the
several owners of partial interests
of their corresponding rights in the
fund which has been substituted
for the property taken :" Edmands
v. City of Boston, io8 Mass., 535,
544 (1871).
In Wiggin v. Mayor of New
York, 9 Paige's Chan., i6, 19 (1841),
WA.woRRTH, Chancellor, said: "If
the tenant has a beneficial lease,
that is, if he has rented the property
for a term of years at less than the
use of the property was actually
worth, he sustains damage by being
deprived of the occupancy at this
low rent during the remainder of
his term. But that damage must
necessarily go to diminish the
amount which the landlord would
have been entitled to receive if the
property had not been under a
lease, or had the rent reserved upon
the lease been the full value of the
use of the lot. The proper way of
assessing the daniages where two
or more persons have distinct in-
terests or estates in property taken
for the improvement is to ascertain
the damage to the whole fee of the
lot in the same manner as if one
person alone had the entire interest
therein; and then to apportion the
amount among the. persons inter-
ested in the lot, as landlord and
tenant, or otherwise, according as
the interest of the one or the other
will be affected by the taking of
the property for the improvement."
A similar decision was given Zn
re Application by the City of Buf-
falo, i Sheldon (N. Y. Super. Ct.),
408, 411 (1874), where SMITH, J.,
said: "This fair market value
which is the just criterion, is not
to be enhanced or in any manner
affected by different or conflicting
rights of parties, having different
estates or interests in the same
land. The sovereign must pay for
the property taken but once, and
but one price for the whole, em-
bracing the estates, rights and in-
terests of all who have any claim.
It is taken as an entirety, and in
the first instance, and so far as the
sovereign is concerned, the com-
pensation is to be fixed without
regard to the separate rights of
those owning or interested in the
land, as between themselves ...
The commissioners are to fix a
value upon each separate estate
and interest in the land, but this is
only for the purpose of awarding
to each his just proportion of the
whole compensation to be paid."
In Coutant v. Catlin, 2 Sandford
Ch., 485, 488 (1845), it was said
that the proper mode of assessing
damages where two or more per-
sons have distinct interests or
estates in lands appropriated by
